T amaru N oriyoshi
To discuss the whole range of such issues cannot of course be the task of a single paper. In the following an attempt, more mod est in intention and limited in scope, will be made to examine some of the concepts or definitions now current in the study of religion and to assess their respective theoretical value. In the process, some contribution may result, it is hoped, in the elucida tion of at least some aspects of methodological questions impor tant to the discipline. The topics to be taken up include the the ories of "the high god," of "the sacred" or "the h o ly ， " and of "ultimate concern." This arrangement rests neither on an im plicit order of preference nor on a chronological scale of develop ment, but has somewhat different reasons to be made clear in the conclusion.
T H E " H IG H G O D ' ' T H E O R Y
The first type of theory considered here revolves around the no tion of a "high g o d ， ' or "supreme being" and has been advocated by a number of prominent scholars such as R. Pettazzoni and G. Widengren. As is well known, it was Andrew Lang who first be came aware of the existence of a belief in high gods among cer tain tribes living on a very primitive level. In his book The mak ing o f religion (1898) he advanced the revolutionary thesis that such a belief in high gods marked the initial stage of religious lif e ， ' thus rejecting E .B .1 ylor5 s view of the animistic origin of religion in general.3 This idea was then picked up by Wilhelm Schmidt who, with the help of historico-ethnological method， elaborated it into the grandiose theory of Urmonotkeismus. As a result of the subsequent debates for and against it, this theory, at least in its rigid form, seems now to have been repudiated as an oversimplifi cation of historical data.4 The fact remains, however, that a belief in high gods can be found both among some primitive peoples and in the ancient religions, and on this basis R. Pettaz zoni sought to establish his thesis of the all-knowing sky gods. This thesis may be regarded as a kind of continuation and revi sion of the view propounded by Schmidt.
The standpoint of G. Widengren likewise seems to be akin to that of Pettazzoni, though in him other elements are also dis cernible, such as certain ideas of the so-called myth and ritual school of S.H. Hooke and others. Since Widengren is at present one of the most influential exponents of the high-god theory, I shall consider it in some detail.
Widengren's views are generally distinguished by two features, namely, anti-evolutionism and anti-manaism, both of which are closely interrelated. In the preface to his Religionsphanomenologie (1969) ， based on the Swedish version of 1945， he states that the book was originally written in conscious protest against the evolu tionism then predominant in his country, but that the anti-evolu--tionistic approach he espouses has in the meantime become inter nationally accepted.5 The term "evolutionism" is intended to include not only Tylor's conception of religious history as devel oping from animism through demonism to theism and Marett5 s postulation of a stage of animatism before animism，but also Robertson Smith's view that ritual takes precedence over dog as preanimisdc. Gf On the basis of the premises broadly outlined above, Widen gren goes on to give his definition of religion. He thinks that "the belief in god constitutes the innermost essence of religion， ， and that "the belief in god stands at the center of religion." "What is characteristic of religion is not a belief in something filled with power, nor a worship of spirits, but primarily the belief in g o d .， ， 9 As a definition of religion, however, this is insufficient. History shows that high gods often tend to retire into the background and become dei otiosi， another class of divine beings, assuming prominence as the actual objects of worship. When this objection is taken into account， it becomes necessary to in troduce another viewpoint. This Widengren finds， following H. Sunddn and J. B. Pratt, in the attitude of individuals and groups toward "a destiny-determining p o w e r.， ， 10 People are religious insofar as they adopt a positive attitude toward a power or powers, they conceive to hold ultimate control over their interests and destinies. Widengren sees that this view applies especially well to the type of belief in god that centers in the high god. For the 6 .
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high god, when he remains an active god, is regarded as interven ing and shaping the life of people both for good and evil. Thus the presence or absence of destiny-determining activity marks the difference between a real destiny-god and a deus otiosus.
In its concrete forms the belief in god naturally varies from reli gion to religion. Still, the major forms occur with amazing reg ularity in the history of religions. The major types Widengren distinguishes are pantheism, polytheism, and monotheism. These types may be found across the historical religions, so that in one and the same religion different types can coexist.
What is worth mentioning here is that Widengren seems to give a certain priority to pantheism which regards the world as the body of god and thus puts the two in equation. Ih is is, as it were, a naive form of pantheism which can later be translated into more speculative formulae as in the case of Indian metaphys ics. Pantheism is also closely related to the frequently encoun tered bisexual features associated with high gods among various peoples. As for polytheism, its emergence must be ascribed to a combination of different factors. Widengren first points out that a series of deities in a polytheistic system may be explained as a consequence of the separating out of aspects or attributes formerly associated with high gods.1 his is particularly true of the so-cal led functional deities usually regarded, according to Usener，as. "momentary deities." In addition, the importance of local cults as well as political influences in bringing about a polytheistic phenomenon cannot be ignored. Polytheism, properly speak ing, represents a further development in one or the other of the two major forms of belief in a high god, namely, pantheism and monotheism.1 1 It is neither possible nor necessary to enter here into the rich historical evidence presented in Widengren's magnum opus in support of the high-god theory. Suffice it to say that Widengren gives a central position to the idea of the high god in his definition of religion.
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With this much as background, I should now like to make a few comments of a somewhat critical nature.
First of all, it must be pointed out that in establishing his thesis Widengren draws mainly on historically derived materials, most ly of a mythological nature, taken from the sphere of ancient reli gions. More concretely， it is on the basis of evidences from non literate tribes in Africa and Asia and from traditions among the Indo-European and Near Eastern religions that he formulated the above view. The religions of the Far East, including Japan, receive short shrift, and hardly any attention is paid to the reli gions of the modern world.12 This bias is not altogether without justification, since the author intended his book as a treatise on the history of religions in the narrower sense of the term, that is, the religions of the past. Nonetheless, this data limitation has a significant bearing on the theoretical status of the view itself.
Second, careful scrutiny reveals that this definition of religion is comprised of two heterogeneous elements. As indicated al ready, Widengren， though convinced of the central importance of belief in god, had to introduce another element-destiny-determination-in order not to exclude the older form of Buddhism from the category of religions. But while belief in god points to the objective side of religion, destiny-determination is a factor that becomes relevant only in relation to the subjective attitude of individuals and groups. If a high god is to remain real and ac tive, it is indispensable that people conceive him as having ulti mate control over their lives. And indeed there are many cases where high gods are deemed to possess the power to determine the destiny of man. But the fact that this power is ascribed to them does not prevent them from losing it and retiring into the background, nor does it logically exclude the possibility of peo pled conceiving of agents other than high gods as ultimately shap ing their destiny. To summarize, the high god theory may best be characterized as a sort of descriptive concept derived from a limited number of materials relating to the history of religions. Problems arise as soon as an attempt is made to enlarge the concept and make it cover all religions， as Widengren does when he says that the belief in a high god is "the core of every religion.'， 13 In other words, the high god theory is one of low to middle range, applicable mainly to the historical religions. Taken as such， however, it can prove useful， and it offers a plausible explanation of certain de tails such as the emergence of the functional deities referred to above.
T H E O R IE S O F " T H E H O L Y " O R ' ' T H E S A C R E D ，，
The second major group of definitions of religion is that which takes the term "the holy" or "the sacred5 5 as the key concept. This approach is probably the most influential one at the mo ment.14 Especially since the publication in 1917 of Rudolf O t to's famous Das H eilige， this mode of definition has become so widely accepted that it would seem difficult to find a work in this area in which the term does not occur. Gustav Mensching, for example, defines religion as "the experiential encounter with the Nonetheless, despite the predominance of this view that focuses on "the holy" as the distinguishing characteristic of religion, this approach is by no means exempt from ambiguities, nor is there a total absence of disagreement among scholars employing the term. In order to clarify the issues at stake, it may be in order to at tempt a brief review of the history of the term. This review will make clear the background against which the word came to enjoy unusual popularity and at the same time make it possible to dis tinguish among various connotations attached to it. For this purpose, we may omit the long history of the ways words like sacer，sanctus, Heil, heilig, holy, etc. were used in theological dis course. It will be sufficient to begin with the turn of the century when words like these began to play a decisive role in theoretical thinking about religion.
Perhaps the earliest contribution to the subject is to be found in the philosophy of religion, for Wilhelm Windelband wrote his article "Das Heilige" for the second edition of his Praludien (1902) .
He treated the problem of the holy mainly from his neo-Kantian point of view, but even so, he was not without influence on ensu ing discussions. Max Scheler， for example, brought the concept of the holy into close connection with his theory of value, and sub sequently it was fully elaborated as an independent axiological category, notably by Johannes Hessen.17 Though we are not directly concerned with such philosophical considerations, at least it should not be forgotten that the concept often carries with it a philosophical implication and cannot be understood unless we give due regard to the philosophical position of the author.
Apart from this philosophical line of thought, there was an other stream that helped give the concept a position of promi nence. This was the so-called of the sacred "is not only universal, but central, is the very condi tion of religious thought and of what is most characteristic in re ligion.9,18 Similar statements can be found here and there in the writings of these sociologists. In their view, objects considered sacred are those set apart and forbidden, objects which stand, therefore, in opposition to the sphere of the profane. The idea of the sacred as something separated and forbidden appears to have been taken over from Robertson Smith's Lectures on the religion o f the Semites (1890)， but was subsequently worked out into an overall dichotomy. Thus we have the well-known definition of religion by Durkheim as a system of beliefs and practices in relation to sacred objects.19 It is noteworthy, in this connection, that the sociolo gical emphasis on the sacred was intended in antithesis to the traditional view that the idea of god is the nerve of religion.
A third point of view, partly if not entirely opposed to the socio logical approach to the sacred, was that of which Nathan Soder blom and Gerhardus van der Leeuw may be taken as the most no table exponents. Though not fully approving the tendency of the French sociological school to identify the sacred with society or to reduce the former to the latter, both scholars shared with the French group the intention of replacing the idea of god by that of the sacred or the holy. This idea they brought into con nection with the concept of power or mana. In a famous article entitled "Holiness" (1913)，Soderblom says: "Holiness is the great word in religion; it is even more essential than the notion of God ... Not the mere existence of the divinity, but its mana， its power, its holiness, is what religion involves." According to him， this holiness is viewed as a "mysterious power or entity con nected with certain beings, things, events, or a c tio n s ， " and its psychological origin is traced to the "mental reaction against what is startling, astonishing, new, te r r ify in g .， ， 20 As may be seen from these lines, the emphasis is not so much on the distinction between sacred and profane as on the experience of power~or to put it differently， on the subjective reaction to awe-inspiring ob jects rather than on more or less institutionalized separation of the sacred. Van der Leeuw likewise regarded the notion of the holy as intimately associated with that of power. His Phanomenologie der Religion (1933) starts with a discussion of the concept of power as basic to religion, and states unequivocally that the idea of god is a "late-comer in the history of religions."2 1 Another, slightly different way of treating the concept of the holy can be found in Rudolf Otto. His approach can perhaps be called psychological, since he devotes most of his Das H eilige to a sympathetic understanding and analysis of the numinous experi ence. Repeated use of the term "feeling" （ "creaturely fe e lin g ， " ■etc.) both in this book and in the collection of essays Das Gefiihl des Vberweltlichen (1932) ， is an unmistakable indication of the na ture of his interest. This predilection for the emotional in reli gion was doubtless inherited from Schleiermacher, and it pro vides common ground, to some extent， between Otto and Soder blom. Yet this was not the whole or even proper aim of his en terprise. For Otto described the creaturely feeling as a ^reflec tion5 5 of man's perception of the holy, that which includes among other characteristics the quality of being "wholly other.， ， At the same time Otto endeavored to establish the holy as an "a priori ■category， " a value-category sui generis. (Here we can see his approximation to the philosophical doctrines of neo-Kantianism, including its axiology.) Precisely at this point emerges the ques tion of how to interpret his theory of the holy. Should it be understood as subject-oriented or object-oriented, psychological or philosophico-theological?22 Otto himself, it appears, remain pp. 731-732. ed peculiarly ambiguous and oscillated between these two ap proaches. It is clear, however, that he regarded the holy as more fundamental to religion than the concept of god. In chapter 15
of Das H eilige Otto distinguishes two general lines of develop ment: "rationalization， ，and "moralization." The numen is rationalized into god and godhead, whereas the holy is transform ed into good and goodness.23 Finally we have Eliade's concept of "hierophany" as a mani festation of the sacred. On close examination, his concept of the sacred proves to be a complex one requiring careful study. Char acteristic of his approach is the attempt to consider all the rele vant forms of the manifestation of the sacred in history and thus to grasp it in its totality.24 A second characteristic feature is his emphasis on the distinction between sacred and profane. Ac cording to Eliade, all definitions of religion proposed so far have one thing in common, that is, each in its own way rests on the opposition between the sacred or religious life and the profane or secular life.25 In this respect he seems to share the standpoint of the French sociologists, but he also parts company with them by reason of his persistent concern with the meaning of such phe nomena. This interest in meaning leads him to identify the sa cred with absolute reality and the profane with its opposite,26 and for this reason he is sometimes accused of mystification and the ologizing. The problem need not be pursued here. Instead, I simply wish to draw attention to the central importance of the sacred in E lia d e ， s concept of religion. As he himself says of relig io n ，i t does not necessarily imply belief in God, gods, or ghosts, but refers to the experience of the sacred.27 As will have been seen from the foregoing, theories of''the holy' ， or "the sacred" are presented in a series of variations, some stres sing the dichotomy of sacred and profane, others the connection between the sacred and power, and still others identifying the sacred with the real and transcendent. Taken together, how ever, they have at least this in common, that they all try to place at the center of religion not the traditional concept of god but the idea of the holy, subsuming the former under the latter. From a different angle, this means that the goal envisioned in the inter pretation of religion is not to take it at its face value as a set of ■dogmas but to see it in the context of the social life of the people concerned (especially in the case of sociologists) or in relation to the subjective experience (as in Soderblom, van der Leeuw, and Otto). In addition to such methodological reasons, mention can also be made of increasing acquaintance with religions that hold no explicit concept of god as we seek to comprehend the general background against which such theories have achieved their re markable popularity. Yet the sacracentric standpoint is not without difficulties. Mention has already been made of the criticism leveled by Widengren, rightly or wrongly, at the notion of power.28 It is also clear that there is a certain ambiguity in Otto's theory of the holy, since it refers simultaneously both to the psychological quality of numinous experience and to the nature of the object. As for the dichotomy between sacred and profane， another component of this approach, some scholars doubt that it is as universal as claimed by its proponents. Bronislaw Malinowski, for example, 28 . Widengren suggests that the concept of " impersonal, universal power is an evolutionistic construction， " whereas the presence of the belief in a high god among non-literate peoples as well as among early civilized nations " is no theory, but a fa c tu al phenomenon" (Religionsphanomenologie, pp. 33 and 47，n. 2, his italics). Personally I am inclined to think this criticism only partly just. For whereas it is evident that we should not ignore facts or relevant data in any form, this does not necessarily preclude the legitimacy of theory-formation-which always implies some sort of construction. Other wise research would be reduced to mere description of so-called facts.
after examining a few cases, came to the conclusion that the dualistic separation need not always be articulated and that the degree of articulation depends on whether religion plays a central role in society.29 Carrying the point further, one could even suppose that the distinction itself is culturally determined, in this case by Christian-Occidental culture.30 Problems like these call for considerable clarification as a precondition of declaring "the holy" or "the sacred" the defining characteristic of religion in general.
R E L IG I O N AS " U L T IM A T E C O N C E R N ， ，
The third category of definitions of religion is that based on the concept of "ultimate concern." Though use of the word ^ulti mate5' is by no means new (it appeared, for example, in J.B.
Pratt's The religious consciousness， 1934, quoted by Widengren), its use in combination with the term "concern" is of relatively recent date. It was first introduced by Paul Tillich in his later works, and its great currency, notably in the United States, seems to have been inspired by his personal influence.
So far as can be seen from published materials, the concept of " ultimate concern" occurs for the first time in the first volume of his Systematic theology (1951) .31 In his earlier works, for example his Religionsphilosophie (1925)， Tillich defined religion as the t£di-rection toward the Unconditional" which supplies all the condi tioned forms of culture with meaning.32 The idea that religion has as one of its functions the grounding of culture both in the positive and negative sense remained basic throughout his life. While, however, the earlier formulation betrays his affinity with the philosophical position of neo-Kantianism, the use of the the word "concern" undoubtedly indicates the assimilation of a more dynamic, existentialist way of thinking that has its center in the attitude of the subject. In his later years Tillich used to say that "religion， in the largest and most basic sense of the word, is ulti mate concern.5,33
The practice of defining religion in terms of ultimate concern has been taken up by a number of writers not only in the field of theology but also in that of the scientific study of religion. To illustrate, Bellah declares that he means by religion " m a n ， s atti tude and actions with respect to his ultimate c o n c e r n .， ， 34 This ultimate concern has to do with what is ultimately valuable and meaningful, and it is one of the social functions of religion to pro vide a set of ultimate values. Here the concept is linked with the functional approach in sociology.(1 his emphasis on coupling ultimacy with the functional point of view is remarkable.) A similar statement may be found in the introduction to Lessa and Vogt, Reader in comparative religion (1958) , where the editors claim to regard religion as "a system of beliefs and practices directed toward the 'ultimate concern' of a s o c ie ty .， ， 35 Again, Robert Baird, adopting Tillich's terminology, defines religion succinctly as ultimate concern, though he does not care to follow Tillich completely in respect of the connotations assigned to the term. Baird prefers to eliminate the tacit reference to the object (Ulti mate Reality and the like), restricting the term to the condition The last example shows most precisely the inherent ambiguity in the concept as used by Tillich. As was the case with Otto's idea of the holy, it may be taken to mean either the attitude of concern or the object of that attitude. At least within the limits of Systematic theology, this equivocation cannot be resolved.37 In a later book, Dynamics o ffa ith (1957) , Tillich came to a kind of solution in that he affirmed both meanings by identifying them with one another. He says that "the ultimate of the act of laith and the ultimate that is meant in the act of faith are one and the sam e， " suggesting that this implies the "disappearance of the ordinary subject-object scheme in the experience of the ultimate, the u n c o n d it io n a l.， ， 38 Since Tillich was primarily a theologian, it was natural and legitimate for him to resort to such an argument. It is equally evident, however, that for the empirical study of religion this is in principle inadmissible inasmuch as the question of the object has to be suspended as falling outside its purview.
If we thus interpret the term as a purely neutral, analytic con cept, bracketing off the theological problem of objective reality as do Baird and others,39 it will have far-reaching consequences for the study of religion.
First of all, use of the term in this restricted sense enables us to include under the heading of religion a number of phenomena' traditionally and in common-sense usage excluded from this category. The outstanding example may be some forms of mod ern socialism or Marxism whose religiousness has been much debated. From the standpoint of the traditional religions, these belief sys tems frequently appear clothed in pejorative designations: "quasi-religion， '，"pseudo-religion， " "surrogate religiosity， '' and the like. These designations are not entirely unproblematic because they imply a value-judgment irrelevant to empirical research. It can be said, however, that the ''ultimate concern" way of look ing at things opens up new vistas and helps us to discern a religious dimension in phenomena that would otherwise be left out of con sideration.41 Thus to define religion as ultimate concern, as a means of providing ultimate values or the like, may prove to be useful to students of religious phenomena particularly in relation to the modern situation where rapid change is taking place and new forms of religiosity are emerging. Indeed, the popular ity of the ultimacy-definition may itself be understood as histori cally influenced, if not wholly determined, by this situation. As Edward Norbeck remarks，the concept of "religion as a set of values that may or may not include ideas of supernaturalism seems also to be a reflection of changing cultural circumstances in our s o c ie ty ， " 42 a reflection, that is, of secularization. This advantage, however, is accompanied by some shortcom ings. Serious criticisms are launched against this way of perceiv ing religion, mainly on methodological grounds. These criti cisms may be summed up in two major points. One is that such a definition is too broad and inclusive, the other that it lacks workability as a tool in empirical study because of its subjectivistic orientation. Probably the most succinct statements embody ing these criticisms are those by Melford Spiro and Roland Rob ertson. Starting from the thesis that the aim of definition is to delineate the boundaries of that which is to be investigated, Spiro finds the core variable of religion in the ''belief in the exis tence of superhuman beings." It does not follow, however, that these beings are necessarily objects of ultimate concern. "Con versely, while religious beliefs are not always of ultimate concern, non-religious beliefs sometimes are." For example, commu nism, baseball, or stockmarket returns may become matters of ultimate concern in some societies， but they are by definition not religious beliefs. In short, Spiro wants to define religion substan tively and not functionally, and this in favor of more precision in defining the boundaries of empirical research. 43 On the basis of a slightly different premise， Robertson likewise finds the definition by reference to ultimacy least satisfactory and prefers the substantive, exclusive approach to religion to the func tional, inclusive one. arguments pro and con, it may be noted that such a criticism seems to have a valid point. For in spite of the advantage sug gested earlier, it is also certain that the concept of ultimate con cern needs more elaboration if it is to be employed as a heuristic tool in empirical research.
So far I have picked up a few prevailing concepts of religion and tried to analyze them briefly, in full awareness of their mutual heterogeneity. For it might be expected that by juxtaposing them in this way, the basic problems in the definition of religion and in theory-formation about religion might come out more clearly than by treating them in isolation from each other. As a result of the foregoing, admittedly preliminary survey, it may be pointed out that the different concepts have varying degrees of applicability to the field of studies from which the relevant data are drawn. Whereas the more descriptive or sub stantive kind of definition focusing on the idea of god (including the high god) or other superhuman beings is primarily congruous with religions in history and/or in the so-called primitive socie ties, the dynamic and functional definition framed in terms of ultimacy is obviously more appropriate to situations where change is in process, as in modern societies.45 The former ap proach is oriented to relatively isolated and therefore easily iden tifiable components, while the latter tends to see religion in the context of, and as an aspect of, the entire life process of the per sons or groups in question. The definition based on the idea of "the holy" may be said to fall between these two poles, since "the h o ly ， " as previously noted, may have a double reference, one to the object， the other to the attitude of the subject.
This schematization does not necessarily mean, however, that
Theorie der R eligion, pp. 7-67， esp. p p . 19 and 60，acknowledges the neces sity of combining both the functional and substantive approaches to religious phenomena.
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The scientific study o f religion, pp. 4-5， 22-27. the various positions are mutually exclusive. We have seen that Widengren, notwithstanding his strong emphasis on the belief in a high god as the core of religion, had to consider another element -the consciousness of destiny-determination-in order to avoid insisting that the mere idea of a god is enough to make a religion (which would have been nonsense). This difficulty comes even more to the fore when one seeks to apply the substantive defini tion of religion to, say, our contemporary age where the belief in supernatural entities as traditionally understood is undoubtedly on the decline. If one sticks rigidly to this position, he would have in the end no religion at all to study-or he would have to search for "equivalents" and "substitutes•， ' This, however, would entail an approximation to the dynamic and functionalist point of view. The infcrcnce to be drawn from the above consideration is the rather commonplace statement that it is extremely difficult to develop a broad concept of religion applicable to difTerent classes of data-in consequence of which different approaches must be used in combination.46 At the same time, one who seeks to de velop such a concept must always be conscious of the distinction between different types of definition-nominal or operational on the one hand and real or essential on the other-and be careful not to confuse them. In practice, confusion often results both in the substantivist and functionalist camps, either through declar ing the belief in supernatural beings the core of every religion or by postulating that every individual or group must at every moment have an ultimate concern. True, these two kinds of concepts cannot be absolutely separated, but they must at least be distin guished for the sake of greater clarity in the study of religion.
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